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Articles
SETTING LIMITS ON SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES IN MARYLAND'S FEDERAL COURTS:
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF BRIGHT-LINE RULES

by Eric H. Singer, Esq.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under federal common law, in criminal cases a wouldbe witness spouse holds the exclusive privilege to refuse
to testify against the other spouse with respect to matters
that might incriminate the non-testifying spouse. I This
privilege, known as the adverse spousal testimonial
privilege or the "anti-marital facts privilege," is supposed
to apply not simply to conduct or events occurring during
the marriage, but to pre-marital events as welJ.2 But
Maryland's district court has split on the question of
premarital applicability in two relatively recent, yet
unnoticed decisions, with one district judge ruling
embracing a per se rule against the privilege, and another
decidedly, but respectfully, rejecting such a rule.
This split, which is discussed in Part II of this
Comment, leads one to question how Maryland's federal
courts will decide a facet of the "confidential marital
communications privilege," a sibling ofthe anti-marital facts
privilege. The confidential martial communications
privilege, which may be asserted by either spouse
notwithstanding one spouse's willingness to testify against
the other, bars testimony concerning intra-spousal
confidential expressions made during the marital
relationship.3 But should the privilege still apply when the
communications at issue occur between spouses who,
though still legally married, are separated, and if not, at
precisely what degree of separation should the privilege
yield? This issue, which has not yet been addressed by
any reported Fourth Circuit opinion, is the focus of Part
III.

II. THE ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE: THE DISTRICT COURT'S SPLIT
ON PREMARITAL CONDUCT
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witnessj,4 the
potential witness spouse, or "Ms. Witness," as the court
referred to her, invoked the adverse spousal testimonial
privilege in a move to quash a grand jury subpoena for her
testimony in a fraud investigation ofher new husband, "Mr.
Target."5 Mr. Target and Ms. Witness, who had been
romantically involved for several years, married one month
after Ms. Witness was served with the subpoena and just
before her expected grand jury appearance. 6 The court
found that the timing, ifnot the fact, oftheir marriage, was
substantially motivated by the couple's desire to acquire
the spousal privilege protection. 7 Although the court held
that the marriage did not qualify as an outright "sham,"
which would have precluded any use of the marital
privilege,S it denied the motion to quash, or, as the court
termed it, the "wedding gift" they had most sought - the
spousal privilege to block the wife's grand jury testimony
against her husband with respect to pre-marriage acts. 9
In so holding, the court did not limit its decision to
the particular facts ofthe case. Rather, the court adopted
a per se rule from the Seventh Circuit case, United States
v. Clark, 10 which held that the adverse spousal testimonial
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privilege does not cover acts occurring prior to marriage. I I
The court in Clark believed such a categorical rule would
be salutary as courts could avoid "mini-trials" on the
sincerity ofthe couple's marriage. 12 Further, the ruling in
Clark was in accord with the Supreme Court doctrine
calling for privileges to be narrowly construed and
subordinated to the greater interest of fact -fmding. 13
The second Maryland federal district court case to
address the adverse spouse testimonial privilege was A. B.
v. United States. 14 InA.B., "Ms. A.B." moved to quash
a grand jury subpoena for her testimony in an investigation
of her husband, a drug trafficking suspect. 15 The subject
of pre-marital collusion was not at issue in this case.
However, the government did seek to question Ms. A.B.
about events that occurred before her marriage, and Ms.
A.B. did assert the adverse spousal testimonial privilege. 16
In support ofits request, the government offered the holding
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witness}, and argued
that the privilege did not apply to premarital events. 17 The
court in A.B., however, rejected the bright line rule in In
Re Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witness}, and granted Ms.
A.B.' s motion to quash. 18
The A. B. court noted that two cases decided by the
Seventh Circuit after Clark specifically stated, albeit in
dicta, that the general rule was that the adverse testimonial
privilege includes matters that occurred prior to the
marriage. 19 Following these decisions, the court inA.B.
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stated that the purpose ofthe spousal testimonial privilege
was to protect "'family harmony by preventing spouses
from becoming adversaries in criminal proceedings. "'20
Furthermore, the court noted that the purpose of the
privilege would be undermined and that "the effect on a
marriage would be equally damaging whether the facts
about which the witness testified occurred before or after
the marriage."21 The court concluded that if a valid
marriage exists, then the privilege against adverse spousal
testimony should apply to all matters, whether they
occurred before or after the marriage.22 Although the court
in A.B. appeared sensitive to concerns about the bona
fides ofthe marriage, it believed that the bright-line rule of
In re Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witness} had gone too
far and stated that "[a]lthough it may be necessary for a
court to delve occasionally into peripheral issues in
determining the legitimacy ofa marriage, this is a far more
satisfactory outcome than simply eliminating all premarital
matters from the scope ofthe privilege."23
Of course, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit will be the penultimate arbiter of the
conflict between In re Grand Jury Subpoena of
[Witness} and A.B. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena of
[Witness}, the court went so far as to predict that the
Fourth Circuit would agree with its conclusion and that of
the Seventh Circuit in Clark.24 In fact, however, the
rejection ofthe bright line rule inA.B. in favor ofan ad hoc
factual inquiry seems more likely to prevail in light ofthe
Fourth Circuit's warning that the marital privilege should
not become an "empty promise."25
Predictions aside, the court in A.B. does seem to
have the better argument. As one federal court has found,

211 See id. n.l (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F.Supp. 988,
989 (E.D. Mich. 1986».

21

Id. at 492.

22

See id.

23

Id.

24
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the rejection of the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
505(c)(2) in 1975, which would have precluded the
spousal privilege for premarital acts, signals the rejection
of a per se premarital acts exception. 26 Furthermore, at
least one other federal district court has concluded that
the categorical premarital acts exception found in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness} simply cannot be
harmonized with the policy behind the adverse spousal
testimonial privilege.27 Finally, although the bright-line rule
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness}, like all
bright-line rules, has the virtue ofbeing easy to administer
and does spare the courts a "mini-trial" in the marital arena,
"sham marriages are not common enough to make the
occasional mini-trial a great burden."28 In short, the court's
holding inA. B. seems to strike the proper balance between
maintaining a privilege that remains socially valued and
protecting against the strategic maneuver of marrying to
suppress testimony.

III. THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE: A RULE FOR SEPARATED
SPOUSES?
As noted above, the confidential communications
privilege bars "one spouse from testifying as to
conversations or communications with the other spouse
made in confidence during their marriage. "29 Unlike the
adverse testimonial privilege, the marital communications
privilege belongs to both spouses and may be asserted by
either one. The privilege looks not to the particular
marriage, but rather "seeks to protect the institution of
marriage generally as a haven for confidential
communication."30 The privilege is "premised on the
assumption that confidences will not be sufficiently

26

See United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).

encouraged unless the spouses are assured that their
statements will never be SUbjected to forced disclosures."3)
The Fourth Circuit, however, has not addressed
whether a defendant who has confidentially conveyed
information to his or her spouse when the two had been
separated can still rightfully assert the privilege. At the
state level in Maryland, the defendant may still assert the
privilege. In Coleman v. State, 32 the Court of Appeals
ofMruyland held that the marital communications privilege
applied, even though, for all practical purposes, the
defendant's marriage had ended at the time of the
confidential communication. The court in Coleman fmUld
that courts would generally have trouble determining the
viability ofthe marriage, and that since the legislature had
codified the marriage privilege without qualification, it was
up to the legislature, and not the courts, to provide
clarification. 33 At least one commentator has suggested
that the federal courts should adopt precisely this kind of
categorical rule of non-inquiry into the viability of
marriages. 34
It seems, however, far too late for the federal courts
to adopt such a rule. Tasked with interpreting common
law privileges, including the marital privileges, "in light of
reason and experience" under Federal Rule of Evidence
501, federal courts have clearly decided that the de jure
validity of a marriage cannot per se "reasonably" trump
the quest for full and complete fact-finding. The question
for Maryland's federal district court and all other courts in
the Fourth Circuit is notwhetherthe marital communications
privilege yields when the communications at issue occurred
when the spouses were separated, but at what point in the
separation (prior to divorce) it should yield.
The Fourth Circuit will have to choose between the
relatively easily applied rule of "permanent separation"
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Byrd, and the more
detail-oriented and apparently higher threshold of
"separation plus irreconcilability" created by the Ninth

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F. Supp. 988, 992 (E.D.
Mich. 1986).
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Note, "Honey, The Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the
Marital Privileges, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 868 n.127 (1992)
[hereinafter Abrogating the Marital Privileges].
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281 Md. 538, 544-55, 380 A.2d 49, 53-54 (1977).
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Circuit in United States v. Roberson. 3S
In Byrd, the Seventh Circuit ruled that:
[S]ociety's interest in protecting the
confidentiality of the relationships of
permanently separated spouses is
outweighed by the need to secure
evidence in the search for truth that is
the essence of a criminal trial, and that
proof of permanent separated status at
the time ofthe communication between
the defendant and the defendant's spouse
renders the communications privilege
automatically inapplicable. 36
In Byrd, the defendant, who was charged with arson,
and his wife had been separated for approximately one
year when Mr. Byrd uttered some cryptic yet inculpatory
remarks to her.37 The couple had lived in separate homes
during the separation, although the wife allowed the
defendant to use her basement as a workroom. 38 Prior to
the defendant's trial, the wife filed for divorce. 39 Although
the court in Byrd never defined "permanent separation," it
remarked that the "defendant's conversations are
unprivileged because they were all made during a longterm separation of the spouses .... "40 Though Byrd's
standard of"permanent separation" is imprecise, clearly it
is not synonymous with the notion of"irreconcilability."
As the court in Byrd stated, "[w]e refuse to extend the
communications privilege to permanently separated
couples on the theory a guaranteed protection of

31

859 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988).

36

Byrd, 750 F.2d at 593.

37

See id. at 588.

3A

See id.

39

See id.

confidentiality at this stage might save some troubled
marriages."41
In United States v. Roberson, the Ninth Circuit
rejected what it called Byrd's "categorical rule of'pennanent
separation "'42 when it created a rule allowing the spouse
to assert the marital communication privilege unless at the
time ofthe communication the couple was irreconcilably
separated. 43 In Roberson, two months after the husband
left the marital home, the defendantlhusband told his wife
about a rape he had committed. 44 Immediately upon
leaving the marital home, the husband had initiated an
action for dissolution ofthe marriage. 4S At the same time,
the wife had obtained a temporary restraining order
preventing the husband from re-entering the home or from
contacting her.46 At trial, the wife testified, and the husband
agreed, that the marriage had failed before the time of
communication. 47 After considering the Roberson's
pending divorce action, the temporary restraining order,
and the testimony, the trial judge concluded that at the
time of the communication the marriage was all but
defunct. 48 The appeals court affirmed and held that the
trial judge had correctly concluded that at the time ofthe
communication the marriage was effectively over and that
the marital communications privilege should not apply.49
The court in Roberson rejected Byrd and prescribed
a two-step inquiry. After the trial court determines whether
the husband and wife have separated at the time of the
communication, it must then "undertake a more detailed

41

Id. at 593.

42

Roberson, 859 F.2d at 1381.
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See id.

44

See id. at 1377.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.

41

See id. at 1378.

49

See id. at 1382.

4°ld. at 592 n.3. The Second Circuit has also held that the duration of
physical separation is the primary factor in determining "permanent
separation." See In re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 238
(2d Cir. 1986).
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investigation into the irreconcilability ofthe marriage" at
that time and into whether the couple "had abandoned all
hope."5o Factors that the trial court must consider when
making its determination include the stability ofthe marriage
at the time ofthe communication, any divorce actions filed
at the time, divorce pleadings, settlement agreements or
proposed property agreements, allegations of gross
misconduct or grievances over a period of time, reasons
given by the parties for prolonged absence from the home,
and the couple's statements as to irreconcilability.51
When deciding whether the privilege applies, other
federal circuits have referred to both Byrd and Roberson
without choosing the standard from either case. 52 The
Fourth Circuit, however, should affIrmatively select the
Seventh Circuit's marital communications privilege rule of
"permanent separation" over the Ninth Circuit's rule of
"nTeconcilability" for three reasons.
First, it is relatively easy for couples to follow and
rely upon the "permanent separation" standard. While it
is true that the "[marital communication] privilege only
weakly serves the purpose for which it exists, in that few
couples presumably know of this privilege or rely on it
when making marital confidences[,],,53 the permanent
separation standard would generate less uncertainty than
would "irreconcilability" as to when spousal
communications will remain confidential. Second, ifthe
courts are to continue assessing marital viability,
determining whether a couple is substantially physically
estranged is far easier for the courts than determining
whether their marriage is irrevocably defunct. 54 Third, and
more important, this bright-line rule, unlike that adopted
in Clark and In re Grand Jury Subpoena of[Witness],
does little violence to the specific purposes ofthe marital

communications privilege itself. Because evidentiary
privileges impede the truth-seeking process, they are meant
to be construed narrOWly. 55 In Roberson, however, the
Ninth Circuit struck a balance between privilege and factfinding unduly favorable to spouses.
IV. CONCLUSION

"[S]ociety has little interest in protecting the
confidentiality of separated couples whose marriage has
failed by the time ofthe communication."56 However true,
whether the marital communications privilege should give
way to society's truth-seeking interests only when
irreconcilability is established is open to serious doubt.
Do separated couples actually maintain an expectation of
confidentiality up until the time they view their marriages
as defunct, as opposed to when they are permanently
separated? Should the community's interest in truthseeking in criminal trials really be suspended until marriage
has failed, as opposed to when the couple has permanently
separated? It will be interesting to see just how solicitous
ofthe privilege the Fourth Circuit will prove to be.
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